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CONSnTUTIONAL LAW---¥1PTH AMENDMENT-RIGHT OF DEFENDANT IN 
DENATURALIZATION PROCEEDINGS To REFUSE To TESTIFY-The United States 
as plaintiff instituted denaturalization proceedings alleging that deliber-
ately false statements were made by defendant at the time of his naturaliza-
tion. No "affidavit showing good cause" for such suit, required by section 
340 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,1 was filed with the 
original complaint although one was filed with a later amended complaint. 
When plaintiff sought to take defendant's deposition pursuant to rule 26, 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,2 defendant appeared for the examination 
but refused to be sworn. He was taken before the district court which 
directed that he be sworn, and he again refused. From a conviction of 
contempt defendant appealed, alleging that jurisdiction did not attach 
since the required affidavit was filed after the original complaint, and that 
pre-trial discovery procedures should not be applied to denaturalization 
proceedings since, as a defendant in such a proceeding, he was privileged 
to refuse to take the stand at all. The Second Circuit affirmed,3 holding 
that the affidavit could permissibly be filed with an amended complaint, 
and that denaturalization proceedings are not sufficiently criminal in their 
nature to entitle a defendant to refuse to take the stand. On certiorari to 
the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed per curiam. "An affidavit 
showing good cause is a prerequisite to the initiation of denaturalization 
proceedings. The affidavit must be filed with the complaint when the 
proceedings are instituted." Matles v. United States, 26 U.S. Law Week 
3282 (1958). 
The Court's summary disposition of the case represents an extension of 
United States v. Zucca,4 which held only that the government's refusal to 
file any affidavit at all was grounds for dismissal, and the majority of lower 
courts which had considered the question raised in the principal case since 
Zucca had held that the affidavit could be filed after the complaint.I> The 
1 66 Stat. 260, as amended 68 Stat. 1232 (1954), 8 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1957) §145l(a). 
2 28 u.s.c. (1952). 
s United States v. Matles, (2d Cir. 1957) 247 F. (2d) 378. 
4 351 U.S. 91 (1956). 
5 See cases cited in United States v. Matles, note 3 supra, at 380, note l; United States 
v. Ercole, (E.D. N.Y. 1957) 148 F. Supp. 481; United States v. Davis, (E.D. Mich. 1957) 
149 F. Supp. 249. 
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result reached was consistent with a dictum in Zucca,6 however, and is 
illustrative of the Court's special concern for defendants in denaturaliza-
tion proceedings. This handling of the case, while not without significance,7 
left open the more~interesting constitutional question as to the scope of 
the Fifth Amendment. 
At common law the defendant in a criminal case was not a competent 
witness. This incapacity to testify has been removed by statute in the 
federal courts, 8 but under the privilege against self-incrimination contained 
in the Fifth Amendment, the accused may refuse to be sworn; the prosecu-
tion is not even allowed to call him to the stand.9 The privilege against self-
incrimination is applicable to civil as well as criminal proceedings,10 but 
in the former it may not properly be invoked by a refusal to take the 
stand. In the ordinary civil case the privilege must be separately invoked 
as to each question which may tend to incriminate. There are several 
dangers presented by this limitation: the witness may be held to have 
improperly invoked the privilege and thus to be in contempt; he may 
already have testified sufficiently to have lost the privilege through in-
advertent waiver;11 his refusal to answer may have prejudiced the jury 
against him despite instructions to the contrary. In the principal case the 
court felt that these dangers were effectively counteracted by the special 
nature of denaturalization proceedings.12 Under the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act of 195213 the exclusive procedure by which a United States 
attorney may bring denaturalization proceedings is the filing of an equitable 
action to cancel the certificate of naturalization, accompanied by an affidavit. 
6 "Vve believe that, not only in some cases but in all cases, the District Attorney 
must, as a prerequisite to the initiation of such proceedings, file an affidavit showing 
good cause." United States v. Zucca, note 4 supra, at 100. 
7 If the two-sentence opinion truly means that failure to file the required affidavit 
with the original complaint does not give the court jurisdiction, it may become a basis 
for upsetting past proceedings in which a defendant was declared denaturalized. 
8 18 u.s.c. (1952) §3481. 
o Calling a defendant to the stand would emphasize his refusal to testify and might 
lead to a drawing of inferences from this refusal which is prohibited in the federal 
courts and in the great majority of state courts. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §§2268, 2272 
(1940). The accused in a grand jury proceeding cannot refuse to take the stand since 
there is no final determination of guilt or innocence. United States v. Scully, (2d Cir. 1955) 
225 F. (2d) 113, cert. den. 350 U.S. 897. 
10 McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924). 
11 This is well illustrated in the recent case of Brown v. United States, 26 U.S. Law 
Week 4201 (1958). There a defendant in denaturalization proceedings, also under §340(a), 
who voluntarily took the stand for direct examination, was held to have waived his 
privilege against self-incrimination to the extent of relevant cross-examination, and his 
contempt conviction was accordingly affirmed, four justices dissenting. 
12 United States v. Matles, note 3 supra, at 382 and 383, emphasizes that denaturaliza-
tion proceedings are tried by the court and not to juries and that the defendant has 
notice of the issues in advance and the advice of counsel throughout .the proceeding, 
thereby reducing the possibility of inadvertent waiver. 
1s 66 Stat. 163, 8 U.S.C. (1952) §1101. 
808 MICHIGAN LA w REVIEW [Vol. 56 
The basis of such action has been changed by this act from procurement of 
naturalization by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresenta-
tion. Although the action is equitable in nature, it differs from the ordinary 
civil action in several respects. In addition to the affidavit requirement 
which formed the basis for the Court's reversal, the government needs more 
than a bare preponderance of evidence to prevail; there must be evidence 
that is "clear, unequivocal and convincing," which does not leave the issue 
in doubt.14 In addition a minority of the Court has argued that the precious 
nature of the right of citizenship and the severity of the penalty of denatural-
ization should put these actions in a class by themselves.15 These differences 
show the danger of labeling a denaturalization proceeding a "civil action" 
and then applying the far-reaching pre-trial discovery procedures of rule 
26(a) to such an action. If these procedures are utilized by the government, 
the defendant faces the very real danger of being obligated to disclose in-
formation sufficient either to cause his denaturalization or to lead the gov-
ernment to such information. The defendant can be forced to disclose facts, 
even though they would be inadmissible at the hearing, so long as they are 
reasonably calculated to result in the discovery of admissible evidence.16 
While these consequences are not undesirable in the usual civil action for 
money damages or injunctive relief, they are far more serious in an action 
where the final judgment of the court may impose a penalty more severe 
than that imposed for many criminal acts. Chief Judge Clark, although join-
ing in the decision on this point in the Second Circuit, displayed some 
14 Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943). This requirement of proof 
has been followed in Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665 (1944), and 
Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654 (1946). However, §340 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952 casts doubt upon this rule, since it provides for certain statutory 
presumptions of evidence which would fall short of the "clear, unequivocal and con-
vincing" requirement. See comment, 51 MICH. L. R.Ev. 881 (1953). 
15 Schneiderman v. United States, note 9 supra, at 125. Justice Murphy, delivering 
the majority opinion at 122, stated that the government was trying to deprive petitioner 
of the "priceless benefits" that derive from citizenship. "In its consequences it is more 
serious than the taking of one's property or the imposition of a fine or other penalty. 
For it is safe -to assert that nowhere in .the -world today is the right of citizenship of 
greater wox:th to an individual than it is in this country." Denaturalization is not an 
ordinary civil action since it involves "an important adjudication of rights." See also 
Justice Rutledge's dissent in Knauer v. United States, note 9 supra, at 675, where he 
states that the drastic penalty of denaturalization requires procedural safeguards equally 
as effective as those employed in an action to take away a native born citizen's status. 
16 Rule 26, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 28 U.S.C. (1952). The extent to which a defendant 
can be required to answer in a pre-trial examination is illustrated in United States v. 
Beano, (S.D. N.Y. 1954) 16 F.R.D. 379, where the court ordered defendant to answer 
questions as to (1) names of pex:sons who :had invited him to communist meetings, or 
who were present, or whom !he knew to be ,members of the Communist Party, (2) whether 
he had been or was a member of .the Communist Par.ty, or had participated in communist 
activities, (3) whether he had consulted a certain attorney prior to obtaining naturalization 
and whether :he had ,been referred to her, and (4) whether the union of which he was an 
official was dominated by the Communist Party. 
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hesitancy in labeling denaturalization a "civil action" for all purposes17 
and in the light of the essential differences between denaturalization and 
other civil actions, this hesitancy is well-founded.18 
Theodore G. Koerner 
17 United States v. Matles, note 3 supra, at 381. 
18 There is language in Brown v. United States, note 11 supra, at 4204, which indicates 
that the Court might permit a defendant in denaturalization proceedings to refuse to 
take the stand. "Such a witness ~as the choice, after weighing the advantage of the 
privilege against self-incrimination against the advantage of putting forward his version 
of the facts and his reliability as a witness, not to testify at all." In context, however, 
this statement was probably not intended to apply to procedures under which tbe de-
fendant can be called involuntarily, such as rule 26 or rule 43(b), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 
28 u.s.c. (1952). 
